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Governance: Myths and Reality 
Speech to the Institute of Directors Annual Dinner at the 
Wellington Club on 14 November 2013. 
By Sir Roderick Deane 
 
It is a great privilege to be asked to speak to you at your annual 
dinner and I am deeply conscious of the wonderful array of 
experience and insight which is represented here this evening, In 
particular, I am conscious of being surrounded by such a fine 
gathering of Members, Fellows and Distinguished Fellows who 
comprise so much of the much respected strength and influence of 
your distinguished organization.  
Indeed, when one surveys the disconcertingly formidable and 
comprehensive documentation underlying your Constitution 
(which I note has no less than 26 objectives in it – I do hope you 
not only know them all but also meet them all), your splendid 
Code of Ethics and your 36 clause Code of Practice, one could 
become quite hesitant about sharing any lessons from a simple 
personal perspective. With over 6000 members, the IOD is 
unquestionably the pre-eminent corporate governance body in New 
Zealand. In looking around the room, I am delighted to see so 
many familiar faces. 
In reflecting on some of my personal board experiences I thought I 
would see what common themes I could draw upon.  
It is now 40 years since I joined my first major board, that of the 
International Monetary Fund in Washington DC. There were 20 
executive directors and 20 alternate executive directors. I was the 
youngest board member.  
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This huge board sat sometimes for 3 or 4 days a week as we waded 
our way through a massive reform of the international monetary 
system. But there was a surprisingly shared vision which drove us 
all to work together. And strong leadership and many talented 
board members and an outstanding staff team helped.  
In the days when many countries still had fixed exchange rates, 
exchange controls, import licensing and tariffs, as New Zealand 
did, the vision was that of a monetary system which was 
potentially free of those encumbrances and one which would allow 
countries the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances 
without perpetual balance of payments crises.  
Despite the large, diverse and multi-nation board, we worked with 
remarkable cohesion over two years towards a framework which 
helped underpin the floating rate, free trade, open financial market 
arrangements we all benefit from today.  
I had the great good fortune to sit next to the United States 
director, Sam Cross, from whom I learnt much about the politics of 
the international game as well as much about international 
economics. Sam would routinely check what I was going to say 
and happily straighten me out if the economics were not in good 
order. 
My other experience of a huge board involved my many years at a 
senior level and particularly as President of the IHC, perhaps New 
Zealand’s largest voluntary welfare charitable organization. The 
IHC has about 6000 staff and supports around 6000 people with 
intellectual disabilities.  
Of all the organisations I have had a good fortune to work with, it 
has been the most rewarding. I chaired the New Zealand Council 
which met for two full days once a quarter and comprised about 60 
members.  
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This was during a period of high drama for the IHC when it almost 
went bankrupt on several occasions (due principally to the 
Government pulling the rug on substantial previously promised 
funding grants); youngsters with disabilities were finally granted 
access to a free education in regular schools and many special 
schools were closed down; the old pyschopaedic hospitals were 
closed down and several thousand residents moved out into regular 
houses in the normal community, the IHC purchasing 700 houses 
to facilitate this; and there was a substantial push towards getting 
more regular work for those with disabilities.  
The challenges were huge, the politics complex, and the IHC 
governance structure heavy duty, reflecting the splendidly 
democratic and egalitarian nature of the IHC as an incorporated 
society.  
But we succeeded. Again, the reason lay in strong leadership, a 
shared vision, clear goals, strong individual accountability and an 
overwhelming determination to succeed. The experience of 
chairing AGM’s over two days with 600 people on the floor was 
salutary, occasionally exhausting, but wonderful. 
By contrast, as Chairman of the State Services Commission during 
the huge public sector reform period, the Commission board was 
just 4 of us, then 3. We met at least weekly and oversaw reforms 
such as the creation of nine new state owned enterprises, some of 
which are being partially privatised today, a freeing up of the 
employment arrangements within the public sector, the delegation 
of many centralised roles out to departmental heads, and a 
reduction in the number of staff in the core public service from 
86,000 when I commenced as Chairman to 35,000 under my 
successor, Donald Hunn.  
Working with people of the outstanding calibre of Don and Dame 
Margaret Bazley on a tiny but hugely effective board to achieve so 
much in a relatively short time frame was a unique albeit at times 
searing experience.  
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The politics of it were hell, the media sceptical, but the outcome 
amazing. The success of those reforms resulted again from a 
remarkable alignment of interest between the various stakeholders, 
most particularly the Government Ministers, the leaders of the 
public service and the many top business people who gave 
generously of their time to help with the reforms.  
Turning to the perhaps more familiar corporate world, one of my 
most exciting experiences was taking over as Chairman of the old 
Fletcher Challenge Group, restructuring what was then the largest 
listed company in New Zealand, and then chairing the major new 
company to emerge from that process, being Fletcher Building. 
This was relisted in 2001 at number 17 in market capitalisation on 
the NZ stock exchange. By 2009 it had again become number 1. 
We closed down offshore construction, exited the New Zealand 
residential housing market except in Auckland, sold the pulp and 
paper business for $5 billion and an 80% acquisition premium, 
sold the energy business for $4.6 billion and a 60 % premium, and 
listed separately the forestry company. These remain I think the 
largest New Zealand on-market corporate transactions.  
While restructuring the Group, we reduced the size of the 
corporate head office to one third of what it had been when I 
became Chairman. All of this took about 18 months and in one 
year alone, 37 board meetings. Two of our extraordinary 
shareholders’ meetings had 1200 shareholders present. 
The trick was a strongly shared set of goals, agreed uncomplicated 
strategies, clear time lines and accountabilities, a great but small 
team working intimately together, and some courageous and 
innovative thinking. I had the benefit of one of the best boards I 
have ever worked with.  
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We had outstanding people like Paul Baines, Sir Dryden Spring, 
Hugh Fletcher, Kerrin Vautier and Michael Andrews; and of 
course once we got to Fletcher Building, a CEO of unsurpassed 
quality in Ralph Waters, to say nothing of a truly talented 
management team, including people like Martin Farrell and Bill 
Roest.  
The remarkable re-emergence of Fletcher Building from the 
doldrums at No. 17 to regain the No. 1 position on the NZX was 
underpinned by a set of prior agreed and strictly adhered to 
strategies and investment criteria; a range of acquisitions, some 
substantial, all off-market trade deals except for just one significant 
on-market transaction (being the Cranes deal in Australia); and 
equity usually funded by overnight placements rather than 
prospectus based capital raisings.  
The growth was rapid and only slowed by the need for regulatory 
approvals which could take anything from a few months to a 
couple of years, and in one Commerce Commission case, five 
years. It is noteworthy that in the case of major construction 
projects, it typically took longer to get regulatory and RMA 
approvals than it did to build the project. Similarly, with equity 
raisings, not only was the prospectus route lined with risks and 
potential liabilities, it also took much longer than the time we had 
available to do a deal. 
Health and safety legislation is a matter of huge moment to 
company directors today; or at least it very much should be so. Yet 
despite all the rules and regulations, and all the inspectors, the 
essence of improving a company’s track record on health and 
safety is entwined not just with regulatory requirements but much 
more so with leadership, incentives and culture.  
A combination of these factors at Fletcher Building lead to the 
company having a record on lost time from injuries at one stage 
surprisingly superior to that of Woolworths, the largest retailer in 
Australasia with 200,000 staff, and the ANZ Bank.  
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I am not familiar with the ANZ figures today but I am pleased to 
say that an obsession with the issue at Woolworths turned their 
performance around. I sat on all three boards. The legislation did 
not fix matters; it was leadership commitment and a change in 
culture that did the job.  
At the other end of the size spectrum, I have chaired the NZ Seed 
Fund since its inception in 2000. We stuck with a tiny board, just 
three of us, created half a dozen companies based on original 
research emerging from Auckland and Otago Universities, 
outsourced all our services to maintain a low cost base, raised all 
the initial rounds of capital from habitual investors to minimise the 
risks, declined to apply for government funding (from the Venture 
Investment Fund) because of the need for great flexibility in 
managing and operating seed companies, and changed the CEO’s 
usually several times in the first ten years of life.  
All of this resulted in, amongst other things, the listing of two 
companies, Pacific Edge Biotechnology on the NZX and Neuren 
Pharmaceuticals on the ASX. In each case the trick was to have 
clear objectives, measurable milestones, quality management 
suited to each stage of development, decisiveness and flexibility, 
and a rigorous board.  
My Seed Fund board colleagues, Peter Menzies and Trevor Scott, 
were magnificent. The three of us were non-executive and for most 
of the time we had no full time staff. For each company to succeed, 
clear-cut and decisive governance was the key. No regulator could 
have predicted the multitude of problems we encountered in 
ensuring the companies survived while the science was being 
developed and then commercialized. Interestingly, the formation of 
the predecessor companies to Pacific Edge was very much the idea 
of my wife Gillian, who had previously been funding some of the 
research activities at Otago University. 
 
7	
  
	
  
At the ANZ Bank, where I was a Director for many years in 
Melbourne and chaired the NZ arm, the acquisition of the National 
Bank from Lloyds, a long held aspiration for ANZ, for in excess of 
$6 billion, was a lesson in how governments and their officials can 
invent policy on the hoof and the dangers inherent in that.  
On the eve of the acquisition, the Reserve Bank had new 
legislation introduced in the House by the Minister of Finance to 
provide it with new prudential oversight powers. To cut a long 
story short, the NPV cost of that to the ANZ was about $250 
million, more or less offsetting much of the integration gains the 
ANZ had been seeking through the merger.  
The unpredictability and inconsistency of government policy and 
the huge costs these can incur is too often illustrated in New 
Zealand. Chorus and the power companies are the most 
disconcerting immediate examples but there are too many others. 
You will recall the regulatory tsunami Telecom encountered in 
2006 when the Government, having a year or so previously 
confirmed it was not going to force unbundling, then did so 
without warning and more than $3 billion was wiped off 
Telecom’s market value overnight. The impact of the uncertainty 
created deliberately by the Opposition on the power company 
floats at present is another disconcerting illustration.  
The wonderful irony in Telecom’s case is of course that its main 
competitor, Vodafone, also now complains about regulatory 
intrusions (cf. roaming charges). Beyond that, the Government has 
ended up once again as the largest investor in a sector which was 
once ranked by the Department of Statistics as achieving the 
highest productivity growth rate of any industry in New Zealand.  
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Moreover, the Government has constantly failed to produce any 
cost/benefit analysis on its $1.5 billion investment in ultra-fast 
broadband and the take-up rate is embarrassingly pitiful at 4%. 
Imagine the painfully low rate of return to the long suffering 
taxpayer to say nothing of the uncertainty for the industry and 
some of New Zealand’s largest companies, Telecom, Vodafone, 
Chorus and others. 
Talking of policy uncertainties, the banks must be scratching their 
heads today about the new Reserve Bank loan to value mortgage 
limit constraints. After all, it is only a few years ago that the 
authorities decreed that the bank capital requirements for house 
lending was only half that of other forms of lending, reflecting an 
ill-considered assessment that housing was a less risky form of 
lending. The GFC and the US sub-prime market put paid to that. 
There are those of us who feel strongly that the problems of house 
price pressure and over-exposed mortgage lending are multi-
faceted and cannot be addressed by policies such as the official 
loan to value constraints but instead must be tackled on the broader 
front of freeing up the supply of land; easing other supply side 
regulatory problems; and placing the responsibility for bank 
lending policies squarely on the shoulders of bank managements 
and board. 
So where is all this leading me ? 
In essence, after many years as Chairman of several of New 
Zealand’s largest companies and as Chairman of organisations 
such as the Public Service, the IHC, and the New Zealand Seed 
Fund; and as a Director of organisations ranging from the IMF to 
Te Papa to some large companies in Australia and Canada, some 
strong common themes emerge. 
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First, all the success stories with which I have been associated, 
whether they be growth ones or turnaround ones, have been 
dependent on good governance arrangements. While I prefer small 
boards, such as at the State Services Commission and the NZ Seed 
Fund, I have seen very large ones work amazingly well, such as at 
the IMF and the IHC.  
But what really makes them work well is a strong shared vision, 
creative strategies, clear objectives, individual accountabilities, 
tight monitoring, and of most importance great leadership, quality 
people and good teamwork. Integrity matters above all else of 
course. 
These are not matters which can be regulated or legislated for. 
They come from creative thinking, great commercial intuition, 
good judgement, drive and determination, integrity and heaps of 
commonsense. 
So why is it that Governments and officials think they can and 
should regulate almost every aspect of the commercial world ? 
Let me further illustrate the point. 
Many people appeared to support the recently passed Financial 
Markets Conduct Act. This is not surprising since its stated 
objectives were to avoid unnecessary compliance costs, reduce 
governance risks, promote innovation and flexibility, provide 
understandable information, facilitate transparent markets, and to 
promote informed participation in markets. If you are amazed that 
an enormous piece of legislation could achieve all these inspiring 
objectives, let me assure you that I am quoting from the Act’s own 
preamble. 
So it all sounds great. But herein lies the myth. How can a truly 
massive document of 597 clauses achieve all of this ? I wonder 
how many of us have read and absorbed all of it ?  
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The reality is that many of the matters legislated for would be best 
left to commonsense, commercial judgement and good standards 
of ethical behaviour. In real life, can one legislate for these ?  
We set out numerous rules for takeovers but have you noticed that 
these days hardly any takeovers now take place ? The myth that we 
could protect small shareholders by the Takeovers Act gets 
replaced by the reality that we have much reduced the incentives 
for takeovers to occur. Yet takeovers used to be a major and highly 
useful form of corporate adjustment and restructuring. They were 
also a way to discipline boards which failed to measure up and to 
do this much more effectively than legislative solutions. 
We now regulate financial advisers and yet too many of them have 
become too costly for small investors. Moreover, some of the 
advisory firms have exited the retail market virtually unnoticed by 
the regulators. The myth that we are protecting small investors gets 
replaced by the reality of more expensive advisers. 
We regulate company annual reports to such an extent that they 
become lengthy and difficult to understand. The sections on 
remuneration and notes to the accounts are frequently longer than 
the sections on company strategies and operations. The myth that 
we are clarifying matters for shareholders gets buried under the 
reality of masses of figures barely comprehensible to many 
shareholders. 
We regulate the stock market and the total capitalisation value 
relative to GDP went into a trend decline for a decade, only now 
recovering. The myth that more regulation promoted a healthy 
stock market was belittled by the reality that the relative size of the 
NZX declined on average over many years and IPO’s were few 
and far between compared to a couple of decades ago when many 
new listings occurred each year. It has only been in the past twelve 
months that we have seen an encouraging spate of IPO’s. 
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For many years, small family owned firms typically preferred trade 
sales rather than new listings. Partial asset sales by the 
Government then becomes akin to a rescue operation to resuscitate 
the NZ capital market. 
We regulate prospectus requirements to such an extent that many 
non-finance companies avoid using them. The myth is that a 
prospectus underpins a fully informed share issue but the reality is 
that many corporates now prefer to utilize techniques such as 
overnight placements since they are quicker, lower cost and most 
importantly lower risk than a wider prospectus based issue. The so-
called protection for small shareholders becomes an irrelevant 
myth since in reality they are no longer offered the opportunity to 
participate. 
It is not only actual regulation which is the problem of course. 
Think of how many companies face actual or implied political 
regulatory threats today and you will encompass many of the top 
companies in New Zealand: Meridian, Mighty River, Contact, 
Genesis, Telecom, Vodafone, Chorus, Sky City, Sky TV, 
Auckland International Airport, Fletcher Building, and so the list 
goes on. Their directors live in a world that is hugely demanding 
commercially without the need for all the additional and 
burdensome regulatory uncertainty. 
The irony is that we regulate a huge array of commercial activities 
yet most government officials have never worked in the private 
sector and know too little about business. Even more disturbingly, 
too often they do not seem to know what they do not know. 
At the same time as we have gone through this disconcerting 
process of re-regulating ourselves, particularly in the second half 
of the 2000's, we experienced a slowdown in productivity growth, 
a re-emergence of fiscal deficits, a ballooning of our overseas debt, 
and huge additional regulatory costs for the commercial sector.  
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Yet we all know that it is this sector on which inevitably we must 
rely to generate economic growth and productivity improvements.  
So what does all this amount to ? 
It is simply that the elements which make up good governance and 
strong commercial performance are not the issues addressed by 
regulators. The myth is that they can be; the reality is that they 
cannot be. Yet we have trouble learning and comprehending this. 
Too often when there is a problem in the commercial world, 
someone will turn to the Government for a solution (even though 
we all happily criticise the Government for not solving all our 
problems). So we end up being burdened with masses of rules and 
regulations which frequently do not and cannot address the issues 
which matter most for leadership and governance. 
As directors, as my wife Gillian says often to me, we should be 
careful what we wish for. 
The essence of good governance is not the regulatory framework. 
That can be helpful but too much of it is simply a hindrance. I fear 
that in New Zealand we now have an overabundance of it and fail 
to realise that it will not deliver the economic growth we all know 
we can achieve.  
What matters is strong visionary leadership, great strategies, good 
commercial judgement, quality execution, and a sense of integrity. 
It is these qualities upon which we must concentrate if we are to 
provide superior governance and underpin the country’s economic 
prosperity.  
 
 
Wellington 
14 November 2013 
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